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CARDENAS AND THE CASTE WAR justify land reform and a broad indigenist project; he attempted to mobilize the Yucatecan peasantry along class and ethnic lines and threatened recalcitrant landlords with another caste war should they oppose him. Once armed, however, peasant soldiers turned their rifles not against the landowners but against each other. This essays explores how the Caste War's legacy shaped the development and deployment of indigenist projects in Yucatan from the Revolution to the late 1930s, focusing on Cardenas' aborted mobilization. Along the way, it will consider the impact and efficacy of state-sponsored indigenismo. Above all, it seeks to understand why state efforts to champion the cause of the Maya failed to unify the rural poor of Yucatan under the banner of Cardenismo.
I. YUCATAN FROM THE CASTE WAR TO CARDENAS
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Yucatan recovered from the ravages of the Caste War through a new boom in export agriculture. The invention of McCormick's mechanized harvester fueled global demand for Yucatecan-grown henequen fiber as a binder, which in turn transformed the state from an economic backwater into one of Mexico's most prosperous regions. The white planter class created henequen haciendas, and used debt peonage to coerce Maya laborers into their fields. Even after federal and state troops had driven most of the Caste War rebels into sparsely populated southern and eastern parts of the peninsula (what would become the federal territory of Quintana Roo), the specter of ethnic conflict still haunted the minds of landowners during the Porfiriato.
The growth of the henequen plantation economy spread debt servitude into the Yucatecan countryside. Coming on the heels of the destruction/of the Caste War, intensified capitalist penetration shattered peasant communities in northern, central, and western Yucatan. The splintering of social relationships previously centered on the village broke down collective identity. Consequently, when the Revolution began, the Maya-speaking rural poor in most of Yucatan lacked a shared, common sense of being "Maya," although the individual experience of racial inequality undoubtedly existed among peons and peasants toiling on henequen estates. Despite the breakdown of communally-based indigenous identities, the fact that capitalist production took place on rural henequen haciendas rather than in an urban environment largely preserved Maya language and other culture traits. Even as peons (rural estate workers) continued to speak Maya and celebrate folk religious festivals on the haciendas, estate owners would extend their control over them through practices traditionally a part of patron-client relationships 553 such as loans (for sustenance as well as dowries) and god-parentage. 3 This set Yucatan apart from most of the rest of southern and central Mexico, (like the Maya highlands of the nearby state of Chiapas) where strong communal structures survived. 4 The henequen boom in Yucatan was but one regional example of the remarkable economic growth that took place across Mexico during the 34-year rule of Porfirio Diaz. Porfirian prosperity, which benefited mainly foreign investors and the domestic upper class, was achieved at the cost of considerable repression and political exclusion. In 1911, liberal, middle class reformers supported by popular forces overthrew Diaz's regime in central and northern Mexico. Yucatan did not escape upheaval, but the planter elite managed to weather widespread insurgencies. 5 During the twilight of the Porfiriato in Yucatan, competition among elite cliques for political spoils heightened, and opposition leaders Delio Moreno Canton and Jose Maria Pino Suarez reached out to segments of the population previously excluded from oligarchical electioneering. Mobilizations were met by repression, leading to violence. Despite their popular base and scattered, often bloody attacks against some landowners and representatives of the Porfirian order, these uprisings during the last years of the Porfiriato were far from the potential caste wars feared by some wealthy whites. They were funded, and largely organized, by patrician politicians as part of intraelite struggles. Rival elite factions which used violent uprisings to maneuver for power were in the end able to control or suppress popular mobilizations. Nevertheless, between 1911 and 1915 the plantocracy clung to power in Yucatan, amidst rising elite fears that popular insurrection might escalate into another general racial conflict. 6 In the end, it was a revolution from without, not a popular revolt from below, that toppled the Porfirian regime in Yucatan. General Salvador Alvarado at the head of 6,000 soldiers brushed aside the hacendados' forces 3 Piedad Peniche Rivero, "Mujeres, intercambios matrimoniales y esclavitud durante el porfiriato, 1880-1900," in Othon Banos Ramirez, ed., Sociedad, estructura agraria y estado en Yucatan (Merida: Universidad Autdnoma de Yucatan, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, University of Texas-El Paso, University of Alabama, 1990) and set up a moderately reformist regime which supported the national faction led by Venustiano Carranza. Ruling as military governor from 1915 to 1917, Alvarado implemented a series of legal reforms that ended the more coercive elements of the Porfirian order, such as the near-slave condition of debt peonage. But because Alvarado needed to maintain a functioning henequen economy, he continued the efforts of his neo-Porfirian predecessors to squelch popular revolts that often had overtones (though did not contain the genesis) of a guerra de casta. 7 Alvarado wanted to end the gaping social inequalities between planters and the rural poor in Yucatan. His means of saving indigenous peasants from poverty, alcoholism, and social isolation was an interventionist state to educate, morally uplift and "Mexicanize" indigenous Yucatecans.
8 Ideas of maintaining Maya culture or Maya-language instruction in public schools played no role in Alvarado's project. Despite his apparent obliviousness to Yucatan's past racial conflict and the fact that his 6,000 troops squelched the popular mobilizations of the 1911-15 era, many white planters still feared that another Caste War was in the offing due to the abolition of peonage.
The revolutionary process begun by Alvarado continued after his governorship ended in 1917. To wrest elected office from the hands of the henequen barons, Alvarado had founded the Socialist Workers Party (Partido Socialista Obrero, or PSO) in 1915. The party, later known as the Socialist Party of the Southeast (Partido Socialista del Sureste, or PSS), dominated elected office in Yucatan until the 1940s. It united much of the small middle class, some progressive elements from the old landowning class, and urban workers with rural bosses (caciques) who controlled rural mobilizations. 9 Even with the mediation of the party, the organization (and arming) of peasants during violent political campaigns between 1917 and 1921 would once again raise the possibility of a second caste war in the minds of many white Yucatecos. Conservative opponents of the Revolution would repeatedly charge the PSO/PSS of intentionally trying to foment another racial conflict. Counterrevolutionary planters were not reassured by the fact that the majority of the rank-and-file membership of the PSO/PSS was Mayaspeaking mestizos and indigenous peasants, despite the fact that its leadership was whiter, better educated, and more middle class. Felipe Carrillo Puerto, who displaced Alvarado as leader of the PSS, would later be identified as something of a Maya chieftain, though he lacked most markers of Mayaness (being over six feet tall and having green eyes and fair skin.) 11 His family was far from rich yet had intermarried with some of the state's wealthiest landowners; they were thus identified as part of the white dwellers near the town square known as vecinos (literally "neighbors") 12 Carrillo Puerto's mastery of the Maya language and his efforts to defend communal land rights and improve the economic status of peasants before the Revolution had earned him the trust of the Maya around his home of Motul.
13
Under the leadership of Felipe Carrillo Puerto (president of the PSO/PSS since 1917 and governor since 1922), the PSS developed an indigenist rhetoric to try to mobilize the Yucatecan peasantry.
14 Like other Revolutionary-era indigenists, Carrillo Puerto and his collaborators claimed to be the protectors of Indian people and culture while at the same time advocating the mainstreaming of indigenous peoples, what Knight calls "the progressive, persuasive integration of the Indian into Mexican society."
15 But unlike Alvarado, whose answer to the "Indian problem" ignored or even negated Maya culture, Carrillo Puerto attempted to recover the glories of the Maya past and to more aggressively redress ethnic injustice in Yucatan's history. By embracing a distinctly Yucatecan indigenismo and intensifying peasant mobilizations, Carrillo Puerto would also resurrect the memory of the Caste War. In analyzing Carrillo Puerto's program, Gilbert Joseph argues that this Mayanism was an attempt to encourage ethnic pride as a means of eventually instilling class consciousness, indigenismo being merely a way-station on the road to socialism. 16 Whatever his eventual aim, Carrillo Puerto made Mayanismindigenismo directed specifically at the Maya of Yucatan-a fundamental 556 CARDENAS AND THE CASTE W A R part of his program as governor. And with this explicit championing of the cause of the Maya, the memory of the Caste War would no longer be repressed. Mayanist symbology developed by Felipe Carrillo Puerto and his collaborators blended Mayan iconography with Socialist and even some Christian elements. 17 His Mayanist zeal extended to permitting only paintings with "Maya character" in public buildings. 18 The energetic cultural campaign launched by Carrillo Puerto's government also reprinted classic texts of the pre-Conquest Maya of Guatemala, the Popul Vuh, and the Yucatesan Maya Chilam Balam. 19 The keystone of Carrillo Puerto's indigenist program was the reconstruction of pre-Conquest Maya ruins, intended to remind all peninsular inhabitants of the achievements of the ancient Maya and instill pride among their descendants. 20 Mayanism was not the province solely of revolutionary politicians in Yucatan. At a speech at Chichen Itza, North American scholar John Merriman of the Carnegie Institute celebrated the hard work and enthusiasm of local workers who had labored in the reconstruction of Chichen, and pointed out that the monuments were not built by genies (apparently a common misconception of the day) but by "the Red Race." 21 In a similar attempt to use past achievement of the Maya to instill ethnic identity and pride, Carrillo Puerto not only encouraged the restoration of famous sites such as Uxmal, he instructed town councils across the state to search for ruins in their localities because "they symbolize the greatness of your race."
22 Carrillo Puerto's reconstruction of Maya history extended into the more recent-and more politically sensitive-past. Maya heroes honored by the Socialist Party included Nachi Cocom, who led the sixteenth century resistance to the Spanish conquerors, Jacinto Canek, an Hispanicized Maya baker who led an eighteenth-century revolt against colonial rule, as well as the leaders of the Caste War. 
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The state-sponsored commemoration of the Caste War rebels as heroes, as well as attempts to mobilize Maya-speaking peasants along racial and class lines brought back fears of the Caste War among the henequen barons. Despite the anxiety of the Yucatecan upper class, the arming of Maya peasants by the PSO-PSS did not lead to another caste war. Indeed, conservative parties distributed arms to peasant followers as well, just as white landowners had armed loyal retainers in the nineteenth century. But fears of a potential racial apocalypse might well have contributed to some landowners' willingness to support a revolt by federal military officers stationed in the state. This occurred in December 1923 as part of the national rebellion headed by Adolfo de la Huerta against President Alvaro Obregon and his heir apparent, Plutarco Elias Calles. Carrillo Puerto's supporters largely failed to rally to his defense, and the governor was captured and executed on January 3, 1924. 25 The last words attributed to Carrillo Puerto-"Do not abandon my Indians"-captured indigenismo's blend of empathy and paternalism.
After the defeat of the de la Huerta revolt and the restoration of civilian rule, an internal struggle divided the Socialist Party. The national government ended it by recognizing Jose Maria Iturralde Traconis as governor. Like Carrillo Puerto, Iturralde was of (predominantly if not exclusively) European descent, and from an even wealthier family. Yet like Carrillo Puerto he was identified as a representative of the Maya. One of Iturralde's biographers even claimed Iturralde was the "white god of the Maya" of eastern Yucatan and Quintana Roo. 26 As governor, Iturralde created a Corps of Maya Volunteers recruited from Kanxoc and other small villages around his home town, the eastern city of Valladolid. The discomfort caused by the presence of several hundred well-armed indigenous peasants in the state's capital among Merida's upper crust led to the rapid disbanding of the Maya Volunteers by Iturralde's conservative successor, Alvaro Torre Diaz (1926-30). The Caste War, over in all but the most distant eastern reaches of the Yucatan peninsular for more than fifty years, was still lurking in the collective memory of white and mestizo Merida; the sight of armed indigenous troops from the east in the capital brought back unpleasant memories of the conflict. 28 Garcia Correa's Mayanism, like that of Carrillo Puerto, both patemalistically championed the indigenous peoples of Yucatan and celebrated elements of their culture, while also promising to "modernize" them by spreading Western models of labor, consumption, and recreation. In his 45 Points of Concrete Action for the Socialist Party of the Southeast, Garcia Correa promised to "elevate the Indian to a better way of life, providing such necessities as hygienic houses, clothes, shoes, and other domestic items, while spreading sports and other diversions."
29 Baseball was one way in which Socialist officials tried to improve the lives of the Yucatecan peasantry. 30 Other means included female beauty pageants and male contests to reward the most "hardworking" and "progressive" males; winners were crowned "India bonita" and "Indio robusto." "Modern customs" were to be spread by traveling theater companies, while movies would disseminate science. 31 It was education, however, that was the most prized means of transforming the Maya. Garcia Correa advocated scholarships to send children to Mexico City and abroad, and rural normal schools to train teachers from peasant backgrounds. Education was above all a means of spreading the Spanish language ("castillizacion" in the words of Garcia Correa), which would liberate the Maya from the isolation imposed by their language.
Even as he worked to spread Spanish and Western ways among the Maya, Garcia Correa revived Felipe Carrillo Puerto's attempts to incorporate Maya elements into public ceremonies and state-sponsored organizations-a contradiction that did not faze Box Pato. The Yucatecan Exploradores (Scouts) had ranks with titles taken from pre-Conquest Maya society. 32 
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drawing that used supposedly Maya styles. 33 Just as the Bartolista administration appropriated Maya elements into official art and public ceremonies to bolster its claim to be the authentic and legitimate representative of "the Maya" in Mexico City, the regional bourgeoisie often borrowed (or simply fabricated) elements from Maya culture and incorporated them into their cultural presentations. The "brown-face" of the (mestizo and white) elite of Yucatan served to give the peninsula bourgeoisie a claim to social privilege based on comprehension of "their" Maya, an understanding that outsiders (or huaches, as they are known in Yucatan) lacked.
34 Gustavo Rio's opera Kinchi, which premiered September 17, 1933, featured supposedly Maya music and romanticized recreations of actual events from pre-Conquest Maya history (such as Nachi Cocom's murder of leaders of the rival Xiu tribe). 35 The Garcia Correa regime sponsored the Mexico City performance of Payambe, a similar pseudo-historical drama based on a largely invented Maya past written by white, urban authors.
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While patronizing a purely regional Mayanism, Bartolismo (as Garcia Correa's regime was known) at times also advocated a more national indigenismo that posited a single, trans-Mexican race of Indians. The house organ of the Bartolista PSS, the monthly magazine Tierra, often celebrated the Red or Bronze Race and referred to Mexico as "Anahuac" (the Aztec name for the area embracing most (of central and southern area of the modern Mexico nation). 37 The heterogenous nature of Bartolista indigenismo reflected different political agendas and a variety of intellectual influences. It combined the research of foreign investigators, the romantic race fantasies of bourgeois artists, and Social Darwinist ideas of race which were deeply ingrained in society from the mid-nineteenth century on. 38 Moreover, political considerations often affected the eclectic indigenismo of the early 1930s. This was perhaps most apparent in Garcia Correa's interpretation of the Guerra de Castas, a compelling but potentially dangerous indigenist theme. Bartolista references to the Caste War reflected contradictory attempts to restore pride to the indigenous peoples of Yucatan and at the same time to use the memory of the conflict to justify the PSS's domination of state politics. Tierra published an article shortly after Garcia Correa's inauguration which rejected the traditional view espoused by Yucatan's white elite that the war was a struggle between civilization and barbarism. It argued instead that the Caste War was a tragedy caused by the rich's exploitation of the poor. 39 Although the Bartolista official discourse portrayed the Caste War as a just uprising against oppression, Garcia Correa and his collaborators also used the traditional view of the Caste War as a revolt of semibarbaric Mayas against (white) civilization to forward their own interests in dealings with national elites. During his campaign for governor, Garcia Correa boasted to Mexico City reporters that he would provide "discipline to nourish the idiosyncrasies of the brown multitudes," implying that his administration would prevent another racial conflict. 40 In private, Socialist Party officials issued dire warnings about the possibility of racial conflict; in 1932, a high official of the PSS told American researcher Ruth Clark that peasants must be kept pacified by Garcia Correa's administration because they were "imperfectly civilized" and capable of revolting.
41 Garcia Correa's attempts to centralize political power on a regional level could be justified to national authorities on the grounds that it kept "the Maya" under control and thus prevented another caste war. Ironically, despite Box Pato's calls to spread Spanish fluency as part of the modernization of Yucatan, the power of Garcia Correa's Socialist Party depended on the continuing Maya monolingualism of the "brown multitudes." A federal official sent from Mexico City to observe the senatorial election of 1926 in Yucatan noted that the outcome was virtually predetermined by the Socialist Party. He attributed the party's dominance of local and national elections for years on end to the fact the local authorities and citizens understood very little Spanish, making the PSS the sole intermediary between them and the national government. 42 Not all observers traced the PSS's electoral hegemony to its ability to mediate linguistically and culturally between the Maya and Mexico City. Opponents charged Box Pato with using his Revolutionary Guard (Defensa Revolutionaries to silence opponents through violence and intimidation. Garcia Correa explained the creation of the Defensa by arguing that the death of Felipe Carrillo Puerto justified arming peasants to stave off future counter-revolutions. 44 Significantly, the Guard was never an overtly indigenist instrument; it was recruited not from Maya-speaking communities of the east as were Iturralde's Maya Volunteers, but from local chapters of the Socialist Party from across the state, especially from those in Merida. 45 Quite possibly the absence of racial overtones in the raising of the Revolutionary Guard reflected a decision by Garcia Correa to avoid fomenting fears of another ethnic conflict in Yucatan.
Garcia Correa created the Revolutionary Guard to support his regime, yet its action helped destroy it. In April 1933, he ordered units of the Revolutionary Guard, federal troops, and state police to disarm the local Guard chapter of the small western village of Opichen because it was supporting an opposition candidate in the upcoming gubernatorial election. During a firefight among Guard members, at least 38 male peasants (and reportedly more women and children) were killed. 46 In the wake of the scandal which was widely reported across Mexico, Garcia Correa was forced to take a leave of absence and was later criticized by supporters of the incoming president, Lazaro Cardenas. Cardenas' visit, dubbed "the Crusade of the Mayab" (land of the Maya), attempted to mobilize the Yucatecan peasantry via land reform and indigenismo. In the process of creating ejidos, Cardenas and his collaborators staged massive public ceremonies and travelled to dozens of towns and villages across the Yucatecan countryside. His whirlwind tour aimed not only to publicize his actions, but also to articulate the Cardenista vision of a new rural society. 49 The centerpiece of the Crusade of the Mayab was Cardenas' announcement on August third of his "Solucion Salvadora" (Redeeming Solution) for Yucatan's "Agrarian Problem": nothing less than the total execution of all pending land grants in the henequen zone. 50 The federal government also offered aid for new and existing ejidos, including investments in education, public health and rural infrastructure. 51 Despite his sweeping promises, Cardenas' solution to Yucatan's agrarian problem left more than 10,000 peasants and peons without land (out of a total population of some 60,000). In the coming months, it would be painfully apparent that most of the newly created ejidos suffered from a lack of land, a poor ratio of fallow-to-planted land, and too little access to processing machinery for their harvest. 52 The economic shortcomings of the ejido system explain in part why Cardenismo failed to mobilize a popular base. Peasants and peons exchanged dependency on low wages on private haciendas for dependency on even lower "advances" on federally-controlled ejidos. The Cardenista Crusade's structural transformation of Yucatan failed 49 On parallels between religious missionaries and the Cardenistas to create a new class of loyal ejidatarios (recipients of collective federal land grants), and it encountered serious difficulties in attempting to mobilize Yucatecan peasants along ethnic lines.
Like previous regional projects, the Cardenista national project looked to indigenism to legitimize political aims. Perhaps influenced by Carrillo Puerto's legacy (the president was frequently advised on regional affairs by Felipe's brother Gualberto), Cardenas heartily believed the Maya were not inherently inferior. In fact, Cardenas, like Carrillo Puerto, subscribed to a kind of reverse racism that ascribed certain superior characteristics to indigenous peoples. 53 The president claimed Yucatecan peasants "preserved the traits of their ancient and advanced civilization, as proved by their laboriousness, their cleanliness, and their respect for life."
54 Like Garcia Correa, Cardenas hoped that indigenous people could be redeemed and their innate racial virtues cultivated for the good of Mexico. 55 For both Garcia Correa and Cardenas, education was the preferred means of redeeming and modernizing the Maya, although Cardenas added land reform to the formula for redemption. The Crusade was replete with ceremonial demonstrations of how indigenous people would be saved by the state through schooling, sports, and the ejido.
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Like most previous revolutionary projects that drew on indigenismo, Cardenas' included the Caste War in public discourse. However, his references to the Guerra de Castas were not only more direct than those of previous politicos, they also interpreted it in an innovative manner: the Caste War served to couple agrarian reform with indigenismo. In announcing the transfer of land from haciendas to ejidos, Cardenas declared that "today 90 years after the beginning of the ultimate tragedy of the Maya Race comes the Revolution to give them the henequen fields as minimal compensation for [the Indians'] blood spilled in their struggles for possession of the land." 57 Cardenas also unified socialism and indigenism in his proclamation, setting out to collectivize henequen haciendas for reasons of social justice (land to those who worked it) and racial justice (land to those whose ancestors had lost it). 53 In the process of leading his crusade, the Cardenas would rewrite the Caste War. 58 While land seizures by whites undoubtedly were among the causes of the Maya uprising of 1847, the Cardenista interpretation of the Caste War omitted the strong regionalist and millennial elements of the revolt. Cardenista discourse generally referred to the Maya fighters of 1847 as Indians-not as Maya, much less Cruzo'ob (in Maya "the People of the Cross"), the rebels own name for themselves. While Cardenas styled land reform as historical justice, a cynical landowner might well have asked why he gave land to the peasants of the northern part of the peninsula when most of the Maya of that region had actually allied with the whites against the rebels from the south and east.
Despite Cardenas' historical omissions in his invocation of the Caste War, his reference to the conflict served to elicit landlord cooperation by acting as a thinly veiled threat, a process examined below. Cardenas' interpretation of the Caste War also illuminated a specific feature of the larger Cardenista program of indigenismo: an attempt to subsume indigenous peoplesregardless of specific ethnic characteristics-into a single category of "Indian." The Cardenista idea of Indianness and his nationalism demanded an interpretation of the Caste War that downplayed the separatist and specifically Maya nature of the revolt. 59 The creation of a strong Mexican national identity based on pan-Mexican Indianness was especially important in Yucatan, an area with marked secessionist tendencies. Accordingly, Cardenista discourse restyled the Maya as generic, rather idealized, Indians, even as it linked indigenismo with land reform. 60 Speaking to Mexican journalist Fernando Benitez almost two decades after the Crusade, Cardenas continued to ignore the separatist, religious, and ethnic nature of the conflict, stating that "the so-called Caste War was nothing more than a peasant rebellion caused by the maltreatment they received and the misery in which they lived." 61 At times the economic determinism of many Cardenistas in Yucatan led them to consider the Caste War as just a class conflict without 58 For a reexamination of the actual historical origins of the Caste War, see Terry Rugeley, Yucatan's Maya Peasantry and the Origins of the Caste War, 1800-1847 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996). 59 The idea of a single, all-encompassing "Indian" identity had been anticipated by Porfirio Diaz when he erected a statue of Cuauhtemoc, the last Aztec emperor, in Mexico City. Diaz's project, however, was strictly for elite consumption, while Cardenas' was not only directed at a broader audience, it also implied positive actions on the part of the national state to aid indigenous minoritiesfundamental characteristics that Porfirian proto-indigenism definitely lacked. Knight "Racism," p. 79. 60 For a discussion of how Cardenismo attempted to reformulate ethnic and class identities from above in a region very different from Yucatan, Michoacan, see Becker, "Black and White To be sure, Cardenas' use of the memory of the Caste War, like his use of indigenism in general, was not always ideologically coherent or consistent. He raised the possibility of a Maya revolt like that of 1847 to threaten landowners, but at the same time lumped the Maya into a generic Indian identity. Cardenas was genuinely concerned about the condition of Mexico's indigenous peoples, but was not an ethnographer. As a politician with an imperfect understanding of Yucatan's past and present, he faced circumstances that forced him to pursue a variety of political and rhetorical strategies, which in turn led him to represent the Maya and their history in contradictory ways. The public ceremonies staged by state and federal officials provide further insight into the heterogenous nature of Cardenista indigenist and agrarian ideology.
After the proclamation of agrarian reform in Merida, Cardenas and his entourage moved south to the hacienda Temozon to stage a ceremony August eighth. The Cardenista magazine Menzay ("labor" in Maya) claimed it symbolized the struggle for land across the state. 63 Officials supposedly chose Temozon because it was the site of an ambush in January of that year in which two young peasants affiliated with a Communist syndicate were killed. 64 The land was thus hallowed by blood shed by the slain young peasants, Mena and Sosa, who were now declared agrarian martyrs. The agrarian fiesta at Temozon consisted of an elaborately planned celebration that dragged on for hours under a blazing August sun. 65 Before Cardenas proclaimed the transfer of Temozon's land from owner Humberto Peon Suarez to former peons, a series of peasant speakers who represented all of Yucatan's peasants engaged in a symbolic dialogue with their secular messiah. 66 One unidentified Maya speaker at Temozon was photographed addressing the president, and the caption in Menzay read "the Mayas have not opened their mouths to explain their situation in a long time." 67 Significantly, among the demands voiced by the supposedly long-quiescent peas- ants was a request for them to be armed-a suggestion warmly applauded by the crowd that probably underscored the possibility of another caste war to hacendados. 68 Peasants who were to receive land then demonstrated the numerous stages in the cultivation and processing of henequen that began with the clearing of land and ended with the packing of the fiber. Such a presentation of industrial choreography not only displayed the disciplined skills of Yucatan's rural workers, it served to answer landowners' doubts that peasants were unable to cultivate henequen without their guidance. Later, members of the newly-created ejidos of Temozon and surrounding areas paraded along with federal soldiers and their uniformed wives before hundreds of bussed-in peasants waving small red pennants emblazoned with the phrase "Agrario" ("Land Reform") and a scythe (a symbolic reference to the peasants taken from Communist iconography). The ejido also received a federal school named for the "martyrs" Mena and Sosa from Cardenas. Sports, another important part of Cardenista social reform, was present in the form of games between the baseball and basketball teams of ejidatarios and the federal Agrarian Department. Like the parade, these games allowed peasants and federal agents to share public space, implying equality.
Other public ceremonies during the Crusade of the Mayab reinforced the themes of indigenismo and agrarian reform, and sketched the new rural society envisioned by the Cardenistas; the reality of life on the ejidos was often fundamentally different. Although the dialogue between Cardenas and peasants as well as the games and marches uniting bureaucrats and ejidatarios suggested egalitarianism, the day-to-day operations of the collective land grants demonstrated to the ejidatarios that federal officials were definitely in charge. 69 Not only were indigenous people subordinated in the new Cardenista order; representatives of the state or urban, mestizo society often appropriated elements of Maya culture. At a festival staged for the visiting president at the beginning of the Crusade, regional political officials presented a series of songs and dances representing a highly stylized Maya culture. First, two men identified as spokesmen of the workers and peasants addressed the crowd-the latter was actually a career politician booed by many in attendance. Then, students and workers performed versions of peasant dances ("A la Vaqueria" and others). Next, students from Merida performed the "Dance of the Maidens and Warriors" from the Bartolistaera opera Kinchi, a performance supposedly based on pre-Conquest dances. In all these acts, students and workers represented-or, more accurately, impersonated-Maya peasants and members of an imagined pre-Conquest Yucatan for the benefit of the president. 70 Cardenas departed the peninsula before Independence Day (16 September), but in his absence Gabino Vazquez, Secretary of the federal Agrarian Department, presided over a ceremony that capped the Crusade of the Mayab: the dedication of the just-completed Ejidal Stadium of Izamal. The ceremony and the building itself showcased Cardenista ideas linking sports, agrarian reform and indigenismo through architecture, rhetoric, and public ceremony. The stadium's location had great historical significance. Izamal was noted both for the grandeur of its huge but still unexcavated Maya ruins, and for the strength of its conservative and religious sentiment. 71 In March 1922, Governor Felipe Carrillo Puerto supported the town council of Izamal's decision to take over the convent to house a rationalist school, much to the outrage of the faithful of Izamal. 72 Masons and Catholics had feuded there during the height of Callista anticlericalism in the late 1920s, and a riot between the two nearly ruined a visit by then-candidate Cardenas in 1934. 73 While religion had dominated Izamal's past, the agrarian faction that emerged in 1936 controlled Izamal at the time of the Crusade-a historical transformation marked by the transfer of Izamal's convent to the ejido. 74 The stadium's architecture expressed Cardenista ideology. Built around an ex-religious building, it mutely preached the triumph of the secular state over the Church. Moreover, because the convent had previously been con- 70 Diario de Yucatdn, 6, 7 August 1937. 71 Izamal's conservative, Catholic reputation was probably due to the fact that it was the home of a large convent and impressive colonial church, and was the staging ground of the conservative revolt that toppled a Jacobin liberal governor during the Reform. Hernan Menendez, "El liberalismo en Yucatan: De la Reforma al Imperio," Unicornio ( structed on top of Maya ruins, the stadium physically anchored the Cardenista present to the Maya past. At the same time, the stadium obscured public space associated with the old regime (the convent, a relic of colonialism) and created a new ceremonial space dedicated to sports intended to inculcate the new values of the post-Revolutionary state. 75 In erecting a forum for sports and secular ceremonies, the Cardenistas posited a new division of time through national festivals and new forms of leisure to be practiced there.
76 Symbols of the Cardenista national state adorned the interior: a portrait of Cardenas gazed down over everyone entering the stadium. Beside it was the shield of the national Agrarian Department. 77 A plaque above the entry spelled out the building's relation to indigenism and agrarian reform: "Above these ruins that were the grand constructions of our ancestors, we raise this ejidal stadium where strong men and future generations of ejidatarios will be forged." Slogans emblazoned on the walls of the stadium stressed themes such as popular support for Cardenismo ("All for Cardenas . . . to victory or death"), the link between sports, masculinity and citizenship ("Clean bodies, Strong men"), and the importance of the ejido to the nation's economic health ("The mass of peasants will rise again and increase the economy of Yucatan").
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Gabino Vazquez, who often represented Cardenas in the state, personally oversaw the stadium's opening ceremonies on Independence Day. Vazquez said (through a Spanish-Maya translator) that the president wished he could be here "because the Maya race has here its strongest force and its independence."
79 His speech reminded peasants of land reform taking place elsewhere and advocated sports to strengthen the ejidatarios. After a procession of soldiers, ejidatarios, and students from the Federal High School bearing the national and agrarian flags paraded, a flame symbolizing the liberation of the peasants was lit, adding a touch of Olympic majesty^8 0 Finally, Vazquez presented a corn-grinding nixtamal mill to the women of Izamal, installing it in the same building that was used as an arsenal by the 75 Agrarian Militia, which in turn was adjacent to a children's park; the arrangment symbolically unified men, women and children under the state's benevolent authority.
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Ceremonies accompanying the opening of Izamal's stadium, like those for the announcement of land reform, acted as blueprints of sorts for the Cardenista vision of rural society. The corporatist structure drafted by the Cardenistas would integrate indigenous peasants directly into the state and eliminate both the old landed elite and the caciques as intermediaries. Indigenismo, agrarian reform, and sports lauded at Izamal were all means to the political end of strengthening the national state and directly incorporating the popular classes into it.
III. THE CASTE WAR THAT WASN'T: PEASANT MILITIAS AND LOCAL VIOLENCE
Cardenista indigenist rhetoric and symbology wove together diverse elements of the archaeological record with imagined (at times quite fanciful) recreations of the Maya past. Moreover, Cardenista ceremonies suggested that though the great ancient Maya civilization had long since vanished, the modern Maya could regain their dignity-with state help. But the public remembrance of the Caste War in Cardenista discourse also presented another image of the Maya, that of an oppressed group capable of rising up and taking vengeance against its tormentors. Cardenas' invocation of the Caste War in his proclamation of land reform raised the possibility of another racial conflict should landowners not comply with Cardenista agrarian reform. In an interview with the state's largest hacendados shortly after the proclamation of his redeeming solution, Cardenas reminded them that if their estates were not divided up and land given to the peasantry, the possibility of an armed uprising against injustice remained.
82 His implication that resistance to land reform risked another caste war was made explicit and public in the Cardenista magazine Young Guard, which reprinted the president's warning that the failure to execute the long-delayed land reform "would leave the future potential of a local armed movement raising the agrarian flag against the maintenance of an unjust situation." 83 The probability of another caste war had already been increased by the creation of the Agrarian Militia in late 1936. However, a closer examination of the peasant militia's operations in Yucatan not only reveals that Cardenas' threat of 5 7 0 CARDENAS AND THE CASTE W A R second Caste War was a hollow bluff, but also sheds more light on the difficulties the Cardenistas encountered in attempting to mobilize peasants along class and ethnic lines.
Fears that the upper class and conservative elements in the Army might mount a coup against him led Cardenas to authorize the formation of a national peasant militia of 70,000 members known as the Agrarian Reserve in October of 1936, almost a year before his visit to Yucatan. 84 Presidential advisors believed that arming and training peasants would allow them to protect their land grants, and to serve as leverage against recalcitrant landowners. 85 Anxious to avoid strengthening regional warlords or antagonizing the generals, Cardenas required that the citizen soldiers of his Agrarian Reserve be placed under the regular army's command structure and led by professional military officers. 86 Membership in the national peasant militia would be limited to peasants under 40 years of age who had already received the right to land. At the time of the creation of the Agrarian Reserve, there already was a standing force of several hundred Yucatecos under the banner of the old Bartolista Revolutionary Guard. 87 Federal officials refused to recognize this force as the Agrarian Militia because of its association with the massacre of Opichen in 1933. To build a peasant militia from scratch, federates took between 500 and 600 hundred Yucatecan ejidatarios to Merida in November of 1936, where they received rifles and some rudimentary military training. 88 Afterwards, squads and platoons of the peasant reserves were stationed in their home villages across the henequen zone.
The Agrarian Reserves did not suffer from a lack volunteers; peasants did 84 Ann L. Craig, The First Agraristas. An Oral History of a Mexican Agrarian Reform Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 130-131. Cardenas' announcement of the militarization of ejidatarios sparked demands from other sectors to be armed. Teachers in Mexico City asked that male teachers receive military training, and that female teachers be trained as military nurses in order to combat enemies of socialist education. The national Confederation General de Trabajadores (CGT) requested that urban workers be armed in order to combat extremists on the right and left. The cordage factory workers of Yucatan took advantage of Cardenas' presence to ask that workers be armed like the peasants. Cardenas refused petitions to arm urban workers or government employees, and the closest that the cordage workers got to military training was a drum and bugle corps. 571 not evade service in it as they sought to avoid the leva (draft) into the regular army. 89 In fact, upwardly-mobile rural Yucatecans who had already held civilian office or built up a small clientele used military posts to advance their own political careers or to consolidate their hold over local power. Federal officials were well aware of the potentially destabilizing effect that the creation of peasant militias could have on local politics; the Ministry of War repeatedly ordered that the Agrarian Reserves not take part in politicswith little effect. 90 In order to weed out would-be caciques, the peasant militia was to be made up of peasants with "revolutionary principles." But in practice, ideological purity was usually equated with loyalty to officials gf the Agrarian Bank. 91 Moreover, there is evidence that the leadership of the Reserves was not composed of average peasants. Parcelarios (yeomen farmers with their own, privately-held small plot of henequen) and even state employees led local units of the Agrarian Reserves.
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Most local militia chapters-leaders and rank-and-file members alikewere chosen from local factions already cooperating with the Agrarian Bank. The creation of the Agrarian Militia exacerbated existing divisions between peasants (residents of towns and villages) and peons (landless rural proletarians who dwelled on haciendas) in many municipalities. Peasants made up the vast majority of recipients of land grants and the Agrarian Reserve, while the peons were generally excluded from both. In regional political conflicts, peasant ejidatarios tended to be supported by officials of the federal Agrarian Bank, while peons were generally organized into peon syndicates backed by the state government. 93 In some cases, the Agrarian Militia program did serve the original mission envisioned for them by Cardenas of empowering peasants against landlords. In Dzidzantun, armed peasants defended their rights to land and access to rasping machinery against landlords. 94 In several other cases, peasants armed by the federal government occupied land after their claims had been frustrated by endless bureaucratic delays, the hostility of Governor Palomo Valencia's administration, and legal stays by the landowners.
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It was more often the case that the peasant militias' actions deviated from their mission of protecting ejidos and thwarting reactionary hacendados. The combination of alcohol and access to firearms through the militia program at times led to violence against a wide variety of targets. On December 22, 1936, in the town of Seye, an employee of the Agrarian Bank and a sergeant in the Agrarian Militia drank, shot out the lights of the town hall, and killed a dog. 96 More frequently, however, peasant-soldiers in Yucatan turned their rifles not against dogs or their class enemies but against factional rivals in local political disputes, often the peons. 97 Indeed, the Agrarian Militia frequently aimed at evening old political scores, and all too often the victims were peons or peasants from rival factions.
In Mococha, a larger village in the center of the henequen zone, peasant politicians and reputed "bosses of the ejido" regained control of town hall and the ejido by using the peasant militia to intimidate local opponents. Ejidatarios of the Agrarian Reserve who resented the town council's opposition to the federal Agrarian Bank and complained of a rigged election threatened local authorities with their newly-received rifles, apparently encouraged by a federal army officer. 98 In nearby Cacalchen and Tepakan, similar armed confrontation occurred between peasant members of the Agrarian Reserve and the town councils supported by peons and the state government.
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Events in another henequen town, Homun, exemplified the endemic conflicts between peon and peasant factions that the Agrarian Reserves were often drawn into. Peons who controlled the town council of Homun with the aid of Governor Palomo Valencia were bitterly opposed by peasants who controlled a national ejido with the support of federal agrarian engineers. 
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federal peasant faction a decisive edge over the peons. 101 Pech's faction had long petitioned the governor to have the town council of Homun replaced with an appointed council more responsive to their interests. Higher taxes and the firing of peasants from local haciendas on the orders of the mayor added to their grievances. Pech and his peasant backers took matters into their own hands on the night of April 12, 1937. His squad stormed town hall, jailed a municipal policeman, and named a town council of its own. 102 Although the state congress refused to recognize the coup, Pech's band allegedly withdrew over 200 pesos from the municipal treasury before abandoning town hall. Their local foes were even more outraged when federal officials blocked criminal charges against them. 103 Such intra-communal feuding involving the Agrarian Militia broke out in other states as well. The violence forced Cardenas to plan to disband the Agrarian Reserves across Mexico in August 1937-ironically about the same time he was threatening the hacendados with them in Yucatan. 104 Less than a year after calling for their foundation, Cardenas announced the dissolution of the Agrarian Militia on grounds that the national army and ' 'class solidarity" gave peasants all the protection they needed. 105 Several months after the end of the Crusade of the Mayab, the federal and state governments ordered the demobilization of the peasant militia. Judging by the reaction of the platoon of Dzidzantun, the peasant militia surrendered their arms only grudgingly, and many units managed to keep their guns for several years more. 106 Perhaps the militia had already served its purpose of intimidating hacendados. In any case, the experiment with peasant militias in Yucatan suggests that this vaunted "class solidarity" still had yet to emerge in many rural communities.
Cardenas scaled back his government's commitment to agrarian reform even further shortly after the Crusade. In 1938 he withdrew the Agrarian Bank from the Henequen Zone, and gave the state government control over the economically-struggling ejidos. Certain hacendados influenced the state's agrarian reform agency (the "Great Ejido") in the later 1930s, and most regained possession of the processing equipment which in turn allowed them to retain much of the economic surplus produced by the ejidos.
107 By the end of Cardenas' term in 1940, both the militia and the president's threatened second caste war had passed into history, leaving no apparent trace in the state's official account of agrarian reform.
IV. CARDENAS IN SEARCH OF THE MAYA
The success of Cardenas' indigenismo hinged on creating a cohesive ethnic and class identity among rural peasants of Yucatan, a task seemingly made easier by the preservation in the Yucatecan countryside of the Maya language and other cultural traits centuries after the Spanish conquest. Yet despite state and federal efforts, Cardenas discovered that mobilization along class and ethnic lines proved extremely difficult. Yucatecan peasants who were of Maya descent, spoke Maya, and lived in a way that seemed to outsiders as clearly "Maya" did not readily identify themselves as "Maya.'' Extant documents from the 1930s written by Maya-speaking peasant authors exhibit little evidence of a Maya identity or consciousness. In dealings with non-peasants, individuals and communities identified themselves as poor campesinos (peasants), ejidatarios, or members of political parties (Socialist), but only rarely did peasants represent themselves as Maya.
low. Ethnohistorian Franz Schreyer has documented how indigenous Nahua-speaking peasants in central Mexico had a strong common identity and unity that mestizo peasants lacked because of a "strong correlation between class membership and ethnic affiliation." 113 Certainly, in Yucatan there was a similar correlation between poverty and Mayaness. Unlike the Nahua communities of Central Mexico studied by Schreyer, however, communal unity had largely broken down in most of Yucatan due to the expansion of henequen plantations in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the closed community which guarded indigenous identity in much of Mexico-including the Maya of the highlands of Chiapas-was probably not present in colonial times in Yucatan. 114 It seems likely that in most of northern and western Yucatan, Maya identity-even if it had been present in the colonial period-had largely disappeared in the social dislocation caused by the Caste War and the spread of the plantation economy. Without strong communities to nurture it, ethnic identity could not spring up from the grassroots.
The creation (or recreation) of a Maya identity was further hindered because the division between the descendants of the Maya and Yucatecans of European heritage known as catrines (city slickers), ladinos, or vecinos was far from clear-cut. 115 Cardenista indigenismo could not address the complex and at times fluid nature of ethnic divisions in Yucatan. Mayaness was determined not only by physical appearance, but language and other mutable markers such as dress. Aspects of Mayaness, most importantly the Maya language, were often appropriated by upper-class and middle-class whites and mestizos; Yucatecan hacendados and their overseers, schoolteachers, and priests knew Maya to a much greater extent than middle-and upper-class whites spoke indigenous languages in other regions of Mexico. Cardenista indigenismo never could clarify the blurry lines between the "Maya" and the "whites."
The artificiality of state-sponsored indigenous projects, weak communal identity, and permeable ethnic boundaries all combined to make collective action along racial lines extremely difficult. Cardenas discovered this when he attempted to raise the possibility of a second caste war. Maya-speaking
